Some Hermeneutic Qualities of a Capabilities Approach by Markle, Joshua R
  
Corresponding Author:  
Joshua R Markle, MA, MEd 
Doctoral Student, Werklund School of 
Education, University of Calgary 
Email: Josh.markle@gmail.com 
 
Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 
August 13, 2019 
ãThe Author(s) 2019 
 
 
Some Hermeneutic Qualities  
of a Capabilities Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joshua R Markle 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper draws inspiration from two seemingly disparate cases – one of friendship and one of 
imagination – to explore some of the hermeneutic qualities of a capabilities approach. 
 
 
Keywords 
 
Philosophical hermeneutics, friendship, imagination, capabilities approach, Amartya Sen, Martha 
Nussbaum, Hans-Georg Gadamer 
In this paper, I explore some hermeneutic qualities of a capabilities approach, a normative 
framework of well-being and social justice developed primarily by Amartya Sen (1980, 1999, 
2009) and Martha Nussbaum (1988, 2000, 2006, 2011), and draw inspiration from a story related 
in the editorial to this 2019 volume of the Journal of Applied Hermeneutics. Moules (2019) 
relates a story in which she shields a sick friend from problems in her own life, so as not to be an 
additional burden (p. 1). Although clearly rooted in an instinct to protect someone she cares for 
deeply, she acknowledges undermining the very principles that permit and animate friendship. 
Friendship requires of its participants the exercise of several capabilities, such as empathy, the 
capacity to love and be loved, and using one’s autonomy to furnish that of another. It also 
demands of its participants two important sacrifices: trust and vulnerability. But as Moules 
(2019) notes, friendship ultimately depends on the capability to choose to be one (p. 2). In the 
sections to follow, I provide a brief overview of Nussbaum’s (2011) capabilities approach and 
make connections to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Along the way, I draw on my own 
experience as an educator, both in a secondary classroom and in a post-secondary program for 
pre-service teachers. 
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A Capabilities Approach 
 
According to Nussbaum (2011), a capabilities approach seeks to answer the following question: 
What is each person able to do and to be? (p. 18). That is, it is not simply concerned with a 
present state of being or doing – what a capabilities approach denotes as functionings – but also 
with a person’s latent potential for choice and action, or capabilities. This emphasis on the 
individual’s potential is one of the approach’s affinities with hermeneutic thinking. One useful 
way to conceive of the relationship between these two key elements of a capabilities approach is 
to understand functionings as realizations or manifestations of underlying capabilities. In this 
light, yet another hermeneutic quality emerges: capabilities are alethic. In being disclosed (i.e. in 
the realization as a specific functioning), what might have been is concealed (i.e., other realiza-
tions).  
 
In her book Creating Capabilities (2011), Nussbaum sets out a list of ten capabilities which all 
people must possess in some shape or form in order to lead lives worthy of human dignity, listed 
below:  
Life: The ability to live a long, healthy life. 
Bodily Health: The ability to have good physical health, nourishment, and shelter. 
Bodily Integrity: Freedom of movement, from violence, and control over one’s body. 
Senses, Imagination, and Thought: This might include basic numeracy and literacy as 
well as imaginative and metaphoric capacity. 
Emotions: The ability to connect emotionally with others; to love; to be the object of 
love; a freedom from fear and anxiety; good psychological health. 
Practical Reason: A capacity for critical thinking and being able to make reasonable de-
cisions for one’s life. 
Affiliation: A freedom to associate individually, politically, etc. 
Other Species: An affinity for the natural world. 
Play: A freedom to recreate. 
Control over one’s environment: This could be political, material, and emotional control 
over one’s lived life. 
 
Each of these capabilities is irreducible and incommensurable – taken together, they constitute 
the basis for a dignified life. One can see elements of friendship, for example, in Nussbaum’s 
capability of affiliation. Specifically, she characterizes affiliation as the capability to “live with 
and toward others” and “to be able to imagine the situation of another” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 34). 
But despite her fundamental role in the development of a capabilities approach, it is important to 
note that Nussbaum’s is but one conception of the approach. Exploring this further assists in 
illuminating the hermeneutic qualities of capability. 
 
In her book Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice (2017), Ingrid Robeyns carefully distin-
guishes between the capabilities approach as a broad conceptual framework and what she 
denotes as specific capability theories, or the various accounts, analyses, and applications of the 
broader framework that exist in the literature (p. 37). To make this distinction, Robeyns (2017) 
parses out the approach into modules, which is helpful for exploring the hermeneutic qualities of 
capability. The modular account affords the opportunity to be explicit in terms of human diversi-
ty, the chosen capability space, unique structural constraints, meta-theoretical considerations, and 
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other aspects of lived experience. This not only reflects a plurality of value inherent in the 
capabilities approach, but of its possible applications, too. 
 
All capabilities theories share a common set of core elements. These elements are what distin-
guish a capabilities approach from other approaches to well-being, such as those rooted in human 
rights or the availability and distribution of resources. A capabilities approach must orient itself 
around these two fundamental concepts: functionings and capabilities. A capability, as Nuss-
baum (2011) notes, is a sphere of freedom and choice, a rich set of potentialities from which a 
person may choose to realize specific functionings. A functioning is a state of being or a doing. 
Functionings constitute one aspect of lived experience: that we are always in a state of some 
being or doing is a defining characteristic of human existence. In many cases, there is significant 
overlap in the nature of a functioning: one can both be numerate and do arithmetic, for example. 
In other cases, the state of being has no corollary in doing (e.g., the state of being a friend). 
 
Yet another quality of functionings and capabilities is that they are value-neutral. That is, the 
capabilities approach reflects two important aspects of lived experience. Firstly, it recognizes 
that not all functionings or capabilities are good. The capability to rape is one oft-cited example 
of a capability with negative value (Robeyns, 2017, pp. 39-40). While a capabilities approach is 
clearly oriented around agency, it is so only insofar as that agency is in service of human dignity.  
 
In establishing functionings and capabilities as value-neutral, the approach compels us to choose 
which functionings and capabilities we value. Robeyns (2017) notes that many capabilities 
theories collapse two normative moments into a single decision in defining functionings as 
“those beings and doings that one has reason to value” (p. 43). Instead, we must carefully 
delineate between the decision to use capabilities and functionings as the interpretive space (i.e., 
to agree on a capabilities approach) and the choice of which capabilities and functionings will fill 
that space. This is an especially important distinction for complex moral questions, such as those 
we find in education, as well as for the practical decisions of living a life. Should children be 
able to determine the content of their learning and how they communicate their understanding? 
Should education cultivate in students the imaginative capacities to live a rich life or the skills 
required to be an economically productive citizen? To what extent should we cultivate the 
capabilities for vulnerability, trust, and friendship as a society? These are also the sorts of 
questions one must approach hermeneutically. 
 
At its most fundamental, a capabilities approach focuses on both functionings (beings and 
doings) and capabilities (spheres of freedom) as the interpretive space in which we can best 
understand individual well-being. It embraces value-pluralism in its strong commitment to 
human dignity. It takes each person as an end and the individual as the ultimate unit of value, but 
it does not do so at the expense of other aggregative approaches to well-being. Rather, it is a 
complement to other approaches. A capabilities approach strives to tell us the most about the 
individual: how one can convert resources into capabilities, how one can realize states of being 
and doing from their capabilities, and about one’s ultimate state of well-being. 
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Some Detective Work: Settling In 
 
When in need of both relaxation and inspiration, I turn to whom I think is one of fiction’s great 
hermeneuts: George Simenon’s Chief Inspector Maigret. The protagonist in Simenon’s slim 
novels bears little resemblance to others in the genre, say Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes or 
Chandler’s Philip Marlowe. Surely, they share a certain mise-en-scene: the streets are gritty, 
knifed with shadow, full of sideway glances and hushed talk. It matters little whether the puddles 
they splash through as they walk their beats are in Paris or London or Los Angeles. But Maigret 
is different. “I don’t go in for deductions,” Maigret barks at an underling in The Yellow Dog, as if 
taking a shot at his esteemed colleague across fictional space and time (p. 69). When a counter-
part questions his method in Maigret, the Chief Inspector asks what he means. “You know better 
than I do,” the man replies. “Usually you get involved in people’s lives; you try to understand 
their thinking and you take as much interest in things that happened to them twenty years earlier 
as you do in concrete clues” (p. 103). Rather than abstract experience into formal logic, like 
Holmes might have done, or punch and stumble his way through high society’s seedy underbelly, 
as Marlowe was wont to do, Maigret, as a superior notes in Maigret and the Toy Village, “settles 
into a case as if it were a pair of comfortable old slippers” (p. 22). 
 
Moules, McCaffrey, Field, and Laing (2015) invoke the insufficiency of the “Raymond Chandler 
method” of inquiry (p. 62). “Hermeneutic practice,” they note, “is a lot like detective work in 
that one proceeds on the basis of attuned perception, concrete discovery, and the imagining (…) 
of possible meanings and courses of action” (Moules et al., 2015, p. 62). We typically associate 
interpretation – or, in the profession’s parlance, cracking the case – with the accumulation and 
analysis of data or clues, but this sort of concrete discovery is only part of a complex process. 
Maigret’s colleagues mistook his attuned perception, his interest in the particular, for a lack of 
method. Heidegger, as Moules et. al. (2015) note, suggested that when “something addresses us 
in the particular, it does so as a case of something that is already significant” (p. 63). Moules et. 
al. (2015) are careful to distance the term case from its typical sense: it is not a body of hard 
facts to be acted upon, but rather “something that has befallen one” (p. 63). Caputo writes that 
the word case is derived from “cadere, casum, to fall, as in a casualty, for which we buy insur-
ance” (cited in Moules et al., 2015, p. x). But in hermeneutics, and arguably for my friend 
Maigret, the case is not merely a particular instance of some universal. For teachers as for 
detectives, it is the individual that is of most importance; universals are simply abstractions. We 
do not presume to crack a case – it cracks us! As Caputo argues, a case does not fall in one’s lap, 
rather one rises to the case: “We have everything we can do to rise to the occasion of the indi-
vidual, to ascend to the thick, dense, rich, complexity of the individual situation, instead of 
lolling lazily amidst the thin transparencies of universals” (cited in Moules et al., 2015, p. x). 
 
Moules et al.’s characterization of hermeneutics as detective work lends itself well to interpreting 
capability. Consider the case of friendship. We can conceive of what friendship might look like: 
a friend is someone who is there for you when you are down, who you share important moments 
with in life, and who you feel you can trust implicitly. These are the sorts of concrete discoveries 
one might make with an attuned perception (Moules et al., 2015, p. 62). But what of the underly-
ing capability set that makes friendship possible? Friendship requires vulnerability, for example, 
but in friendship it must be reciprocal and what is said is as important as what is left unsaid. Each 
offer of friendship is underwritten by a solicitation: will you be mine? And no friendship is 
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settled once and for all. Rather, the functionings and capabilities we require to sustain so com-
plex a human relationship as friendship are in constant flux. One must not only take stock of the 
present state of a relationship, but anticipate a friend’s needs, wants, and desires, to “imagine 
(…) possible meanings and courses of action” (Moules et al., 2015, p. 62).  
 
A concrete example from my practice as an educator might offer further insight. I work diligent-
ly to listen to my students, to hear them, to interpret what I hear in curricular and pedagogical 
contexts, but I often become distracted by institutional constraints, the logistics of schooling, and 
calls for accountability. It is easy to forget what one is listening for, to forget that the goal of 
interpretation is human freedom and that capability is the shape that freedom assumes in lived 
experience. I regularly find the pendulum of my own teaching practice swinging frequently 
between the two extremes of reductive abstraction and a kind of teacherly punch-and-stumble, as 
if specters of Holmes and Marlowe have alighted on my shoulders. In the same lesson, I might as 
easily deduce ideas about a student’s ability from a test score as I induce them from a conversa-
tion in which I am forced to rely mostly on intuition. In cultivating a hermeneutic approach to 
capability, the point is to stop the pendulum, to remain vigilant of both extremes. I must remem-
ber to evoke my friend Maigret. 
 
Of course, a case soon falls in which one is obligated to do just that. In this case – The Case of 
the Mysterious Rock – I observed a student teacher in a grade-three classroom during his first 
practicum in the Education program at the University. His lesson was simple but engaging: they 
were to brainstorm as a class the general characteristics of rocks, then work through stations 
characterizing specific examples. In the first part of the lesson, students raised their hands to 
suggest the general characteristics of rocks, and the student teacher wrote them on the white-
board for all to see. 
 
“Hard,” a little girl called out after raising her hand. 
 
“Yes, rocks are definitely hard,” the student teacher agreed, writing the word hard on the 
whiteboard. 
 
“Rough,” suggested a boy, to which the student teacher again agreed, writing the word 
rough on the whiteboard. All was going as planned. 
 
In our conference prior to the lesson, the student teacher had mentioned one boy in particular. 
This boy had taken out every book in the library on rocks and minerals; he spent his recesses 
“mining” in the schoolyard; he insisted his father take him out looking for rocks on the weekends. 
He was obsessed with rocks, and the student teacher was excited to present his lesson to this boy. 
Consequently, I watched this boy with some interest throughout the lesson, and as students 
continued to suggest adjectives – round, sharp, grey, and so forth – this boy looked increasingly 
pensive. Finally, he put his hand up, and the student teacher smiled broadly when he addressed 
the child. 
 
“Mysterious,” said the boy. 
 
There was a slight pause and the student teacher furrowed his brow. 
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“Well, I don’t know,” said the student teacher. “I don’t know if rocks are mysterious.” 
 
To which the boy relayed a story of finding a rock with his father. The rock they found, said the 
boy, was hard, rough, and grey, but when his dad hit the rock with a hammer, it was filled with 
crystals. 
 
“It was mysterious,” the boy repeated. 
 
The student teacher was intransigent. Mysterious would not end up on the whiteboard. 
 
“That is really interesting, that must have been pretty neat,” said the student teacher, “but 
is mystery a characteristic of a rock?” 
 
The boy scrunched his face up. 
 
“Like, when I say ‘mysterious’,” the student teacher continued, “does it make you think 
of a rock?”  
 
Yes, I screamed from within. The boy said nothing. 
 
“Are there any other ways we could describe a rock?” the student teacher said as he 
turned to the other students. 
 
Something of this story gnawed at me. It was not simply pedagogical. Rather, I felt I had 
watched a scene unfold in which two impulses wrestled and wrangled for dominance. Gadamer 
(1960/1989) writes that the principles of both Romanticism and the Enlightenment secure their 
validity through “the presupposition of the progressive retreat of magic in the world,” and in a 
sense I felt I had watched it recede before my very eyes (p. 275). My own impulse was to lament 
the lost opportunity to sustain a young child’s curiosity, but when I reflected on the lesson, I did 
not feel comfortable with the obvious alternative – writing mysterious on the board and moving 
on – either. At some point, I realized it was not these two impulses, but rather the ontological 
vacuum in which they consisted that required my attention. This manifested itself in the student 
teacher attempting to strip away the boy’s experience from the characteristics of a rock. The 
student teacher discounted mysterious as a characteristic of a rock because it did not fit into a 
methodical basis for characterizing one, namely the senses. Rocks are rough or smooth to the 
touch, can be shiny or grey, feel light or heavy – but with which sense can I determine a rock to 
be mysterious? For the student teacher, the “absence of such a basis [did] not mean that there 
might be other kinds of certainty, but rather that the judgment [had] no foundation in the things 
themselves” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 273). 
 
What I lamented most was the lost opportunity for conversation, one in which each member is 
subsumed and led by the topic. What might the topic have been in this case? It was clear the 
impulse of the student teacher would have been to move the student from unknown to known, 
from mysterious to hard, heavy, and grey. A dichotomy of subject and object and the ostensible 
assurance of method are two defining characteristics of rationalism and the Enlightenment. In its 
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drive for objectivity, Gadamer (1960/1989) argues that one prejudice “defines its essence: the 
fundamental prejudice (…) is against prejudice itself” (p. 273). It was this impulse that made the 
student teacher reluctant to accept mysterious as an answer, but with some justification, too. 
Romanticism’s rebuttal to the enlightenment was to supplant objectivity with the “world of myth, 
unreflective life, not yet analyzed away by consciousness,” which it conferred a “romantic magic, 
even a priority over truth” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 275). In doing so, Romanticism situated 
itself in opposition to the Enlightenment, perpetuating “the abstract contrast between myth and 
reason” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 275). It would do the child an injustice to simply accept 
mysterious as an answer. Rather, it demands a conversation – but which one? 
 
The answer requires good detective work and we cannot arrive at one simply by collecting 
physical evidence. In discussing Heidegger’s notion of Being, Caputo (2018) writes that our 
lived experience is not so easily observable. “We are not simply there, period, not simply present, 
like a rock or a plant which has certain properties,” he writes. “Our Being is more evasive, more 
self-evasive, so a hermeneutic investigation is more like detective work, looking for clues” (p. 
36). But we know there is never just a plant, never just a rock. In discussing Heidegger’s exam-
ple of a table – how such an inanimate object can become enmeshed in and inextricable from our 
experience – Caputo (2018) notes that it is not the table that is meaningful in itself, but in how it 
relates to those who live with it: “The table links us to other people who also sat at it, is marked 
by the times of the day, by the times of life” (p. 41). I think Caputo is right to suggest that if 
Heidegger’s sons happened upon the table later in life, “the whole world of their childhood (…) 
would come rushing over them (Caputo, 2018, p. 41). Much the same for a mysterious rock or an 
old friend. 
 
Square Brackets 
 
In her translation of Sappho’s poems, the Canadian poet Anne Carson uses square brackets to 
indicate missing pieces of text in the papyri. This is not a technical convention, nor does Carson 
mark every gap in Sappho’s work. Rather, the brackets “are an aesthetic gesture toward the 
papyrological event” and “imply a free space of imaginal adventure” (Carson, 2002, p. xi). A 
well-placed bracket is a rich metaphor for capability and offers a fecund space for hermeneutic 
inquiry. In this sense, the familiar notion of giving someone space, whether it be for grieving, 
imaginative flight, or friendship, takes on new meaning – and confers great obligation on those 
involved. The specifics of that obligation are variable. The brackets might be to acknowledge a 
student’s lived experience in the classroom or to furnish the opportunity for one to be vulnerable, 
to be a friend.  
 
Characterizing capability as hermeneutic draws our attention not simply to the act, or functioning, 
but to its potential. Heidegger writes that hermeneutics consists in the “quiet power of the 
possible” (quoted in Caputo, 2018, p. 55). This is arguably true of a capabilities approach as well. 
Of this connection between action and potential, Ricoeur writes:  
 
We could say that a meaningful action is an action the importance of which goes “beyond” 
its relevance to its initial situation… An important action, we could say, develops mean-
ings that can be actualized or fulfilled in situations other than the one in which this action 
occurred. To say the same thing in different words, the meaning of an important event 
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exceeds, overcomes, transcends, the social conditions of its production and may be reen-
acted in new social contexts. (quoted in Arthos, 2000, quotations and italics in original) 
 
Caputo (1987) also writes eloquently of this intimate connection between what is realized and 
what is possible, noting that the “real world is the world which, motivated by actual concatena-
tions of experience, has actually taken shape in experience. And corresponding in this are the 
real and more or less likely ‘possibilities’ opened up by the actual course which experience takes” 
(p. 44). This idea of the opening up of possibilities is echoed by Sen in his discussion of the role 
of education in a capabilities approach and its capacity to make “the horizon of vision wider” 
(Sen, 1999, p. 199). The actual beings and doings of a life are clearly important, but they cast 
long shadows of potential on the “undetermined but determinable horizon of … experiential 
actuality at [a] particular time” (Husserl, quoted in Caputo, 1987, p. 45). Capabilities represent 
this undetermined but determinable horizon, and the best means by which to explore these 
horizons is hermeneutic inquiry; a conversation – but which one? 
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